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 Abstract 
 
This paper addresses the question of whether growth convergence can be 
sustained in the global economy without compromising welfare and without 
causing major crises. It employs a simplified stock-flow analytical framework 
to examine the proposition that the pace and pattern of global growth is 
conditioned by ‘under-consumption’ in some regions of the world and ‘over-
borrowing’ in other regions. A baseline projection using the Cambridge-
Alphametrics model (CAM) illustrates consequences of resumed global 
imbalances after the 2008-2009 crisis. An alternative scenario exemplifies the 
case in which China and India shift towards internal income redistribution and 
domestic demand orientated policies and suggests that this will not be sufficient 
to correct global imbalances or induce improved growth rates in other 
developing regions. Finally a more ambitious development perspective is 
simulated. Such a scenario requires internationally-coordinated policy efforts, 
with greater role for governments in the management of demand, income 
distribution and environmental sustainability, as well as measures to reduce 
instability of exchange rate and commodity markets. 
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1. Introduction 
 
This paper seeks to shed some light onto the central question of our times, 
namely whether, given the state of the world economy, growth convergence can 
be achieved without compromising welfare and without causing global 
economic crises with the potential to wipe out advancements in the desired 
direction. More specifically, the analysis here focuses on the structure of global 
demand and the underlying process of accumulation. The central proposition is 
that as global growth is preconditioned on ‘under-consumption’ in some regions 
of the world and ‘over-borrowing’ in other regions, global imbalances will 
continue to emerge, crises will unravel, and thus neither welfare nor sustained 
growth can result. Against this background, a set of alternative scenarios 
requiring pro-active policies are discussed and their outcomes, simulated with a 
global macro-econometric model, are compared. 
 
The acute reader may have immediately noticed that the approach may be too 
narrow to be taken at face value, since fundamental issues of supply constraints 
may be left unresolved. Indeed, this article is a sequel to Izurieta and Singh 
(2010), in which the question of whether, if India and China expand their 
economies at their desired and recently achieved rates of growth of 9 per cent 
per annum and 11 per cent per annum respectively, there is room for the US 
economy to expand at its full employment rate of 3 per cent per annum. The 
analysis included simulation scenarios using the Cambridge-Alphametrics 
Model (CAM) of the world economy, the same tool used in this article, 
succinctly described again below. Although the model is primordially demand-
orientated in the sense that it seeks to identify demand-side constraints on world 
economic growth, it deals with supply in fundamental ways as explained in the 
earlier paper. Thus, Izurieta and Singh (2010) addressed specifically the issue 
that, left to the operation of free markets and current patterns of production, 
supply-side constraints will be binding and the postulated growth rates for the 
three countries may turn out to be incompatible. Such growth rates would lead, 
over time, to huge energy, raw materials and food shortages, commodity prices 
would sky-rocket and the growth path would become unsustainable.  
 
It was argued in that paper that the three objectives — growth in India, China 
and the United States — were each quite reasonable and socially sensible in 
themselves. US growth is required for full employment in that country and fast 
growth in India and China are needed to reduce the very large numbers 
employed in traditional low productivity activities. Much of this labour force 
needs to be transferred to higher productivity, modern manufacturing and 
service sectors. The paper concluded that growth goals in the three countries 
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could be made compatible provided there was cooperation between them, with 
emphasis on technological progress and industrial policy. Particularly useful in 
this context would be technical progress in India and China on energy saving, 
more economic use of raw materials and greater food production. The main 
message of the paper was that cooperation and policy coordination are an 
imperative as much for the US, even though it is a technical leader, as for India 
and China. 
 
The present contribution is concerned with the same basic issue of possible 
North–South contention but concentrates on a rather different set of analytical 
questions and presumptions. First it examines the question of world financial 
imbalances and their implications for achieving desired economic growth in the 
three countries, which may be regarded as surrogates for North–South 
interactions in the twenty-first century. Opinions differ on this subject. Many 
support the view that global imbalances were a primary cause of the current 
world economic slowdown. Others, however, suggest that since the dollar did 
not collapse and the foreign exchange markets remained relatively calm such 
imbalances cannot be regarded as a major cause of the recession. As will 
become clearer below, the potential for global imbalances is intrinsic to the 
underlying global growth process in the current state of the global economy and 
such potential remains a tangible threat unless addressed head-on.  
 
This article also explores another issue that has generally been ignored in the 
literature, with notable exceptions (such as Akyuz, 2009, 2010a, and Patnaik, 
2008, 2010). At one level the argument is very simple. There has been rising 
income inequality around the world, including in China, India and the US. This 
is attributed partly to the fact that under globalization the balance of power has 
shifted decisively from labour to capital, mainly because capital is highly 
mobile and labour is highly immobile. This in turn has led to a rising share of 
profits in national income in many countries and has been accompanied by 
workers’ real wages falling behind growth of productivity. The final result, at a 
global level, is a shortfall in the level of consumption expenditure and reliance 
on rapid expansion of trade, investment and government spending to maintain 
the momentum of economic growth.1 
 
These and other variants of the under-consumption thesis are examined in the 
light of stock-flow modelling of savings and investments in developed and 
developing countries and are quantified in the last section of this article through 
a new set of simulation studies that relate demand policies and growth rates in 
the US, China, India and the rest of the world, and examine potential impacts 
across regions. Of particular interest is a case in which only the two major 
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countries in the developing world, China and India, shift towards income 
distribution and domestic demand orientated policies in trying to achieve 
sustained growth, but in so doing do not make a meaningful contribution to 
correct global imbalances or trigger growth elsewhere in the developing world. 
Thus, a more ambitious, yet economically plausible scenario is simulated, in 
which a congenial combination of public policy and technology changes brings 
about a desired outcome for the world as a whole. The analysis emphasizes the 
merits of coordination and cooperation between nation states through short-term 
pacts to deal with individual issues within a market-determined global 
environment. 
 
 
2. Global Imbalances and Explanations of The Current Recession 
 
During the years prior to the world recession of 2009, the build-up of global 
financial imbalances, specifically the huge deficit of the US, was seen as a 
major threat to economic stability. The lack of agreement about the central 
causes of such imbalances is apparent in a variety of studies,2 yet, despite the 
diversity of explanations, most studies argued that ‘what cannot continue 
forever must one day stop’. It was feared that the drastic unwinding of 
imbalances might take the form of a slowdown of world growth or a ‘free-fall 
of the dollar’. Policy prescriptions to avert the catastrophe were as varied as the 
alleged causes of the imbalances, and included coordinated exchange rate 
realignment, monetary and fiscal expansion in surplus countries, fiscal 
contraction in the US and other deficit countries and monetary policy targeted at 
asset price inflation.  
 
In the event, instead of a slowdown of growth or free-fall of the dollar, there 
was a meltdown of US and European financial systems, a collapse of global 
stock markets and a sharp recession of a magnitude unseen since the Great 
Depression. Attention focused on the meltdown, explained by the proliferation 
of credit derivatives and the US sub-prime mortgage crisis. Furthermore, the 
recession reduced global imbalances to the extent that to many the imbalances 
appear to be a problem of the past.  
 
Our central thesis is that the recession did not result primarily from a 
proliferation of ‘bad mortgages’ or lack of oversight in the financial markets,3 
but from structural inequalities in global demand and income. Imbalances may 
be expected to return again unless new mechanisms are adopted to coordinate 
national policies, a development that remains something to wish for rather than 
an item on the mainstream political agenda. Two contrasting patterns of 
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behaviour generate ongoing financial imbalances in the globalized economy, 
which could be explained by two complementary theses. On the one hand, 
international competition organized by global capital with labour forces and 
governments in different countries as the chess pieces intensifies the risk of 
‘under-consumption’ by depressing wages, eroding working conditions, 
reducing budgets and limiting social protection. This process has been 
happening in high-, middle- and low-income countries alike, feeding a 
groundswell of protest against ill-effects of globalization. It tends to generate 
surpluses in the most competitive countries where profits and wealth are highly 
concentrated. 
On the other hand, the liquidity of the world financial system and the search for 
maximum returns by an expanding class of global investors has given rise to 
incautious lending and ‘over-borrowing’ in many emerging markets and higher-
income countries. 
 
 
3. The Under-Consumption Thesis 
 
Patnaik (2010) advances the under-consumption argument by comparing 
patterns of production and consumption in India and China with those of the US 
and other high income countries, observing that the growth of global 
imbalances to unprecedented levels before the crisis followed a process of 
‘diffusion of activities’ (mainly, manufacturing and services) from ‘core’ 
countries, led by the US, to the ‘periphery’, notably China and India. The 
diffusion of activities from the core to the periphery is consistent with strategies 
of export orientation in the latter and cost reduction (by outsourcing) in the 
former. The export-led strategy, by increasing production and investment (both 
in the ‘modern’ sectors as well as in the commodity sectors integrated with 
them) resulted in increases of national income, which in the case of China has 
hovered around 10 per cent per year for many years, and in India has more 
recently accelerated to around 8 per cent per year. But wages in peripheral 
countries do not keep pace with rapid growth of productivity in the new 
industries. Therefore consumption does not increase at the speed of income, 
which translates into a tendency towards under-consumption in the country as a 
whole. Unless this tendency is compensated by ever-increasing investment or 
government deficits, the end result is a rising current account surplus vis-à-vis 
the rest of the world.4 
 
Patnaik further suggests that the high profit rate in the periphery implies 
pressure to increase profit rates elsewhere and thus contain wages in the modern 
sector of the world as a whole. Moreover the continuing shift of activities from 
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the core to the periphery leads to a slowdown in employment creation and 
growth of gross domestic product (GDP) in core countries, increasing the 
pressure for wage repression and cost saving.5 Singh and Zammit (forthcoming, 
2011 corroborate this thesis:  
 
Under globalization, the power of workers in most advanced countries 
has been sharply reduced while that of capital has increased due largely 
to the free movement of capital. As real wage growth would be 
increasingly lower than notional productivity growth for the world as a 
whole, the process threatens to result in global under-consumption which, 
other things equal, will reduce both global growth and employment.  
 
The authors go on to suggest the direction for policy action. ‘A more equal 
distribution of income, wealth and social protection, as well as returns to capital 
and labour, are desirable, not only for their own sake but also to resolve the 
incipient world under-consumption problem before this becomes a serious 
obstacle to fast economic growth.’ The under-consumption argument is also 
examined empirically in Onaran (2009), showing long-term patterns of real-
wage income in a number of developed and developing countries. Many other 
studies have shown how income distribution patterns either worsened or 
remained disappointing during the build-up of global imbalances. 6 
 
 
4. Sustained Deficits and Over-Borrowing 
 
A pause is required at this point as the general tendency towards under-
consumption and a rising profit share does not seem to have led to a tendency 
towards rising surpluses in core countries other than Germany and Japan. 
Evidently surpluses cannot be achieved in all countries at the same time. 
Nevertheless large and increasing current account deficits generated in the US, 
the UK and a few other developed countries require further explanation. 
Another reflection with regard to the global under-consumption thesis is that, 
until the global economic crisis, world income had been growing rapidly and 
global employment had been rising (ILO, 2010). Although growth in some core 
countries (Japan and some parts of Europe) had been disappointing, income and 
employment had been on the rise in the countries that incurred deficits. Thus, 
we need to square the ‘under-consumption’ thesis for the world as a whole with 
the facts that world income and employment were growing in the years prior to 
the crisis and that the US and some other countries were fuelling world demand 
by spending more than they earned. 
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Stagnation of real wages in the US, due to the process of profit inflation / wage 
repression noted above, did not need to lead to under-consumption in the 
aggregate. One important reason for this was ‘over-borrowing’ in a context of 
cheap credit and rising real estate valuations. Holding gains allowed households 
to spend more without reducing their wealth. Moreover it appears that, for the 
US as a whole, external assets (investments in other countries) increased in 
value much faster than liabilities, generating holding gains that enriched US 
investors and partially compensated for current account deficits.7 Finally the US 
government contributed to the current account deficit and stimulus to world 
demand by cutting taxes and running sustained budget deficits that were 
financed by global investors. A similar story can be told for the UK and other 
core countries that sustained external deficits before the crisis. 
 
It may be asked why similar ‘over-borrowing’ stimulated by holding gains did 
not take place to the same extent in export-led countries in the periphery. These 
countries have certainly experienced rising prices of real estate and business 
valuations that might have been expected to generate credit booms similar to the 
one in the US. One explanation for the absence of ‘over-borrowing’ in the 
periphery since the late 1990s is that prior episodes in the late 1980s and 1990s 
had already caused localized crises and overhangs of toxic assets that made 
governments, monetary authorities and financial institutions in the periphery 
much more cautious about credit expansion and financial risk. Another 
explanation may be that the substantial role of the state as landowner and 
investor in state enterprises and the high concentration of private wealth meant 
that holding gains were less important for the population at large.8 
 
 
5. A Theoretical Perspective on Financial Imbalances, Capital And 
Wealth 
 
To examine the changing pattern of global imbalances and the impact of ‘under-
consumption’ and ‘over-borrowing’ more systematically, we will first examine 
accounting relationships and simplified characterizations of behaviour that 
provide a logical foundation for analysis of global imbalances and growth of 
income and wealth in a multi-country model of the world as a closed economy. 
The following sections of this article examine model simulations for major 
countries and world regions to consider the scale of imbalances and 
requirements for policy intervention that may emerge in future beyond the 
present recession. 
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Conventional accounting relations that link global imbalances with the pattern 
of income and demand state that, for any country or bloc j, the external balance 
is equal to the difference between income, Y and spending, H; and this in turn is 
exactly equal to the net acquisition of financial assets, NA: 9  
 
(1) j j j jCA Y H NA    
 
Since a surplus is by definition matched with a deficit somewhere else, the 
combined current account for the world as a whole and the combined net 
acquisition of financial assets sums to zero. From this it follows that 
fluctuations of world income are exactly matched by fluctuations of world 
spending: 
 
(2) 
0
world
w w w
w w
w jCA Y H
Y H


  


 
 
At any given time the excess of income over spending in some countries must 
be matched by under-spending elsewhere and world income is equal to world 
spending.  
 
To examine the contributions of individual countries to global spending and the 
pattern of surpluses and deficits it is necessary to make behavioural assumptions 
about the relationship between income, spending and acquisition of financial 
assets. Firstly we may note that spending decisions are made in an uncertain 
environment. They are based on expected, rather than realized, flows of income 
and the resulting gap between income and spending may be different from the 
expected or target rate of acquisition of financial assets that different institutions 
judge to be appropriate. Analytically, extending the notation above, spending in 
each country level is determined on the basis of objectives for net accumulation 
of financial assets NA* and assumptions about expected income Ye: 
 
(3) *e
t t tj j jH Y NA   
 
From (2) and (3) summed over all countries it follows that: 
 
(4) 
*
*
e
j j j
e
w
j j
t t t
t t t
j j j
j j
H Y NA
Y Y NA
 
  
  
   
Or, in other words, realized income in the world as a whole will exceed or fall 
short of the expected level depending on whether the sum of targets for 
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financial assets in the world as a whole represents a deficit or a surplus. Thus 
intended deficits tend to accelerate global growth while intended surpluses tend 
to retard growth. If all countries try to achieve surpluses at the same time, 
income will fall until some countries accept ongoing deficits. 
 
In an economy with a limited or controlled credit system the net financial 
position of households and businesses may be largely driven by liquidity needs 
with the government creating money and the private sector holding deposits. 
There is then a close relationship between the government’s budget balance and 
the external balance (current account) as could be observed in the 1950s and 
1960s. From the 1970s onwards financial systems in most countries have been 
liberalized and merged into a global financial system, creating a situation in 
which the relationship between capital investment, borrowing and financial 
wealth is more flexible and processes determining the net accumulation of 
financial assets in each country require further analysis. 
 
To investigate the formation of financial objectives in stock-flow terms,10 let us 
introduce the wealth identity (W), which comprises both financial (A) and 
physical assets including land (K)11: 
 
(5) 
t t tj j jW A K   
 
and assume a wealth target W* and an adjustment process, similar to Godley 
(1999). Net acquisition of financial assets in the absence of binding credit 
constraints may then be represented as an attempt to reconcile the wealth 
objective with the expected value of real capital: 
 
(6)  
* *
* *
1
.
e
j
t t t
t t t
j j j
j j j
A W K
NA A A 
 
   
 
Recalling (1) and (3) we obtain an expression for the ex-post acquisition of 
financial assets:  
 
(7)   *et t t tj j j jNA Y Y NA    
 
And using (6):  
 
(8)    * 1.e ejt t t t t tj j j j j jNA Y Y W K A       
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Thus the observed net acquisition of financial assets is the outcome of three 
factors: 
i)  unanticipated changes in income  Y - Ye 
ii)  the gap between the wealth target W* and the expected value of real capital 
Ke 
iii)  whether the wealth gap (ii) exceeds or falls short of the inherited financial 
position A-1. 
 
This and other similar models make wealth objectives and the value of real 
capital the long-run drivers of financial positions (see, for example, Izurieta, 
2005). By analogy with savings / investment models, a country will tend to 
accumulate external assets if the private sector’s wealth objectives are not fully 
satisfied by the rising value of real capital or government debt.12  Perhaps more 
pertinently, at least for high-income countries, the country will tend to 
accumulate external liabilities if the value of real capital or government debt 
increases faster than private sector wealth objectives. To put this another way, 
when governments follow conservative fiscal policies and liberalize the 
financial system, the private sector becomes the arbiter of domestic credit 
creation and external financial balances, which in the context of a world with 
global capital and product markets generates sustained imbalances and presents 
ongoing risks of instability with alternating recessions and periods of recovery 
as fluctuations in asset valuations, increasingly synchronized, impact financial 
flows in each country.  
 
As noted above, most of the discussion about the causes of the current crisis has 
focused on unsound mortgages, poorly-understood credit derivatives, financial 
de-regulation, etc., but it should now be clearer that these phenomena cannot be 
taken to be independent of the build-up of global imbalances and opposing 
tendencies towards under-consumption and excess borrowing driven by global 
trade and investment. As Baker (2010) has already warned, ‘over-borrowing’ is 
not to be understood as a marginal phenomenon of citizens without proper jobs 
applying for unaffordable mortgages; Singh and Zammit (forthcoming, 2011) 
highlight this by comparing the formation of asset bubbles in the US with the 
classic ‘tulip-mania’. Rather, over-borrowing needs to be understood in the 
accounting sense of spending in excess of income.  
 
Before summing up, a couple of clarifications are due regarding sector and 
income distribution within countries. The analysis so far has been concerned 
with aggregate behaviour in each country and the world economy as a whole. A 
more realistic analysis, but one which is difficult to implement systematically 
for the periphery, will take account of the role of different institutional sectors. 
10 
  
For example, rich households may be predominantly concerned with 
accumulating financial wealth, poor households with preserving spending and 
social entitlements, local firms with building up their financial position, 
international firms with expansion of capacity or cost-saving strategies.  
 
In addition to income distribution considerations within the household sector or 
between productive sectors, there is also the role of policy makers in 
influencing aggregate income and wealth by fiscal and monetary policy. In the 
US, for example, broadly relaxed monetary policy over the last decade 
contributed to a rise in asset prices and wealth revaluations, leading to a 
continuous rise in private spending while government spending (including 
military) helped to sustain aggregate income.13 In China, India and other 
industrializing countries, an important growth driver has been fixed capital 
investment. Yet, in most countries of the periphery, including India, fiscal 
policy is constrained by the risk of adverse reactions by international investors. 
To base economic policies on enlarging the fiscal deficit the government would 
have to get out of the vortex of globalized finance ‘which requires a basic 
regime shift of a sort that we are ruling out ex hypothesi’ (Patnaik, 2006: 1770). 
A bias against fiscal expansion and growth of government debt has been 
institutionalized by the European Union in general and the Euro zone in 
particular and there is currently strong pressure in Europe to claw back the 
impact on government debt of rescue measures during the crisis by imposing 
more or less drastic cuts in government expenditure and deficits even if this 
implies significant damage to employment prospects and social programmes. 
 
We can sum up by making three observations. First, there seem to be empirical 
and theoretical grounds to back the under-consumption thesis14 applied to the 
last decades of globalization and growing imbalances. Central to this thesis is 
the pressure to maintain a high rate of profit for the world as whole, which, as 
noted by Singh and Zammit (forthcoming, 2011), implies a tendency towards 
global deflation. In terms of imbalances, that would mean a competitive race to 
the bottom in which country after country strives to rebalance and achieve a 
surplus by contracting demand. Yet, the world economy seems to have escaped 
from this predicament by a combination of factors promoting over-borrowing in 
a few major countries. To sustain this, asset prices and public or private 
borrowing and deficit spending must keep rising. However, neither global 
deflation nor large financial imbalances are sustainable in the long run. The 
policy response that emerged in the current recession could be termed 
‘muddling through’ as market forces quickly reassert themselves after costly but 
short-lived government intervention. This is not good enough. Even if some 
countries are able to incur net deficits, raising their income and securing holding 
11 
  
gains at other countries’ expense, it does not follow that satisfactory growth of 
world income can be sustained on this basis. Furthermore, as shown by Akyuz 
(2008), systemic instability will increase and this will hit many developing 
countries as crises erode earlier gains and may on occasion produce longer 
periods of stagnation. 
 
The second observation follows from the first. Since the combined result of 
plans and expectations played out through the markets does not warranty a 
satisfactory outcome, there is a need for policy action at the country level. More 
specifically, fiscal and monetary policy and an environment conducive to 
stability in financial, goods and labour markets are required in order to adjust or 
compensate the autonomous behaviour of households, firms, banks and 
foreigners. However, the extent to which the policies of countries taken 
separately can achieve significantly better outcomes for the world as a whole is 
limited, and the risk is high that new imbalances or periods of low growth will 
re-emerge. For example, Akyuz (2010b) argues that a strategy based on 
domestic reflation and income redistribution in China, which would seem the 
natural course of policy action given the discussion above, may not be good 
enough for the world as a whole and may leave trading partners worse off. This 
is because shifting from export demand to domestic demand implies a large 
change in China’s import propensities and may not provide much stimulus to 
demand in the world as a whole.  
 
Thus, our third observation is that policies at the national level need to be 
coordinated systematically and in different fields of action in order to achieve 
sustained and satisfactory rates of growth and of employment for the world as a 
whole. This is the position taken by leading institutions, like the UN 
(UNCTAD, 2009; UN-DESA, 2006a, 2007, 2008, 2009; UN-GA, 2009), 
institutes like the South Centre in Geneva (Khor, 2010) and to an extent by the 
Group of 20.15 The interest in strategies of international policy coordination is 
not new, however. In the late 1970s and the first half of the 1980s, in the face of 
recurring crises after the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system, 
comprehensive proposals for global demand management were argued (e.g. 
Cripps and Godley, 1978) as academics and policy makers intensified the 
search for new policy rules for the world economy (Bryant et al., 1989). 
However, rising confidence in market-driven solutions since the mid-1980s 
contributed to subsequent neglect of the need for active and coordinated 
government intervention.  
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6. World Economy Scenarios: Global Imbalances and Future Policies 
 
In this section we seek to quantify implications of the preceding discussion with 
the help of simulations for the world economy over the next two decades. Our 
aim is, firstly, to construct a long-term projection for the world economy (the 
‘baseline’), conditional upon the assumption that no relevant changes of policy 
take place and the additional assumption, perhaps more artificial, that the 
triggers that usually lead to economic crises (shocks to confidence or regime 
changes caused by rapid rises of asset or commodity prices, or over-
indebtedness) are not activated. The properties of the outcome obtained under 
such conditions will be inspected in order to assess its viability, the extent to 
which tendencies towards under-consumption and over-borrowing are 
manifested, and the degree to which global imbalances re-emerge. On this 
baseline we then superimpose a scenario suggested by Akyuz (2010b); namely 
pro-active policies in China and India aimed at achieving high and sustained 
rates of growth by shifting away from reliance on export demand and towards 
domestic absorption. The results will be inspected to verify consequences for 
these two countries and the world as a whole with respect to the baseline. 
Thirdly, a more engaging but more hypothetical internationally coordinated 
policy package will be tested to assess requirements for a more equitable 
outcome for the world as a whole.  
 
The simulations are constructed with the Cambridge-Alphametrics model 
(CAM), which is a derivative of a model originally developed at the Department 
of Applied Economics of the University of Cambridge (UK) in the late 1970s 
(see Cripps et al., 1979). Since the 1970s the model has been modified various 
times in significant ways taking advantage of the improved availability of 
statistics and reflecting more recent historical experience. In this article we use 
essentially the same version of the model as in the paper mentioned earlier 
(Izurieta and Singh, 2010) with a slightly different bloc aggregation and some 
improvements in the estimation of debt variables, fiscal and monetary policy, 
and the generation of institutional balances.16  
 
Characteristics of the model worthy of mention here are: 
 
a) The model uses official data from over 120 countries plus residuals for 
each continent (thus including the entire world economy). The main 
sources of data are the UN Department of Statistics, UNCTAD, the IMF, 
the OECD and a few other institutions. Missing data are estimated and 
inconsistencies reconciled according to customarily accepted practices for 
large accounting models. Historical estimations and simulations of the 
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future use a flexible bloc aggregation of data for individual countries. 
Simulations in this article use a nine bloc decomposition of the world. 
Developed countries are represented by the US, Western Europe and 
‘other high-income’ (including Japan and the advanced countries in the 
Pacific, Canada, as well as the newly industrialized countries of East 
Asia). Among the developing and emerging economies China and India 
are taken individually. The bloc of ‘resource-rich middle-income’ 
countries includes the former USRR, West Asia and other middle-income 
countries of East Asia. Low-income countries in East and South Asia 
form another bloc. The remaining two blocs are Africa and Latin 
America. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
b) The economic structure of the model can be represented by the following 
flow-chart, which is quite self-explanatory. A few qualifications are in    
order. At a country/bloc level, income, output and technical progress 
result from the interaction of domestic and external demand and 
constraints. Complementary to the underlying structure of demand that 
triggers technical progress according to historically observed patterns, 
supply continues to exercise a role as natural resource and energy 
constraints feed-back via domestic and international prices. World 
markets for manufactures are represented bilaterally and market shares 
  each country or bloc  
current account  
world markets for  
primary commodities   
and energy  
net imports or exports of  
energy and primary 
commodities  
domestic    
consumption  
and  
investment   
domestic income  ,  output  ,  
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,   
global financial markets   fiscal ,  monetary  
and structural  
policies  global policy  
coordination  
world markets for  
manufactures and   
services  
demand  for  
imports of  
manufactures  
and services  
   
World economy  
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depend on inherited technology and costs. Markets for primary 
commodities, energy and services are unified. 
 
c) Global financial markets match current account flows with the capital 
          account and reserves and determine the valuation of external positions. In 
          addition, the current account and external positions have a feedback on 
          domestic spending decisions, where imbalances usually deter expansions 
         of domestic demand.    
 
d) Within this structure, model equations are defined by accounting rules, 
stock/flow dynamics and other adjustment processes representing private 
sector and government behaviour. Behavioural equations are estimated 
using pooled cross-section data from 1980 onwards. Residuals are 
examined and tabulated such that assumed shocks and policy adjustments 
in simulations are confined to the range of plausible values suggested by 
history. 
 
e) As the model is fully endogenous (in the weak sense that to each variable 
there is an equation, even if an identity or at times a simple autoregressive 
process) an unadjusted baseline can be projected into the future without 
any explicit new assumptions, but in practice the baseline requires some 
adjustment in the light of current developments and anticipated changes 
in trend. Scenarios are constructed on top of the baseline by imposing 
shocks or policy packages (targets and instruments with various types of 
adjustment rule).  
 
The model is well-suited for the task at hand for various reasons. First, the 
stock/flow structure ensures that income and expenditure, financial flows, 
holding gains and asset values are consistent for all countries and institutions 
and for the world as a whole. Wealth, inclusive of holding gains, influences 
consumption, and investment (an accelerator function) is additionally 
influenced by the stock of capital. Deficits and costs of past bail-outs 
accumulate to exert a constraining force on government spending. Second, 
international trade is sufficiently disaggregated into the relevant categories: 
primary commodities, energy, manufactures and services. Therefore, it is 
possible to assess the evolution of trade and GDP performance as countries 
diversify out of extraction activities as suggested in Patnaik’s ‘diffusion of 
activities’. In addition, exports and imports are influenced by inherited patterns 
of specialization and thus it is possible to trace changes in import demand as a 
country shifts between export demand and domestic demand. Third, policy is 
designed in a way that comprehends both endogenous patterns embedded in 
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historical relations, like rules for determination of the fiscal stance and 
monetary policy targets as well as ex-ante changes introduced as shocks or 
‘add-factors’. In addition, policy simulations are constrained by ‘historical 
constancies’ and require explicit specification of sets of instruments and 
patterns of adjustment to achieve desired targets. Finally, the model is 
historically determined and the model’s structure is, to the extent possible, 
geared to capture variations from bloc to bloc and over time in ways that are 
endogenously determined. In other words, if a country’s performance is 
different than elsewhere, it is generally because relative income, balance 
constraints, terms of trade, etc., exercise a discriminating difference and, to the 
extent that such differences narrow or widen over time, so do the implied 
changes in behaviour. 
 
The way in which this model resolves the usual limitations of representing the 
dynamics of inflation and income distribution in realistic fashion also needs to 
be understood. For example, as a departure from the rather pervasive use of 
production functions à la Cobb-Douglas to represent growth,17 in this model the 
fundamental conditions underlying supply are captured by historical estimation 
of technical progress triggered by the forces of domestic demand and export 
diversification. Supply constraints are reasonably well transmitted through 
volume and price changes by the estimation of capacity constraints leading to 
price escalations, but such changes do not trigger the usually rigid endogenous 
responses that can be observed in ‘inflation-targeting’ models. On the one hand, 
the often assumed impact of the interest-rate response to inflation attributed to 
such models disregards the problem of ‘pushing from a string’ as much as the 
perverse impact of interest rates on prices. Besides, as happens in other 
empirical models that cover a large number of countries, it is impossible to 
include important asset prices such as real estate and stock market indexes 
explicitly. On the other hand, the combination of inflation and interest-rate 
dynamics has, in reality, ambiguous interactions with the exchange rate and 
external demand. Thus, in this model there is a weak response from supply 
constraints via interest rates and therefore monetary policy is not as effective as 
textbook economics proclaims. Meanwhile, price inflation dynamics are 
sufficiently well captured and, apart from the endogenous impact on output, 
however weak, the modeller must take price escalations as ‘amber lights’ when 
inspecting the viability of a model solution. 
 
With respect to income distribution, the CAM model lacks the typical wage–
profit schedule that is usually at hand in other models that explicitly assess 
dynamics of income shifts as development proceeds. The latter kind of models, 
of which the most notable ones owe to the ‘structuralist’ tradition initiated by 
16 
  
Lance Taylor (Taylor, 1991; Naasetepad and Storm, 2006; Vos et al., 2002; 
etc.) offer a rich variety of insights by evaluating whether growth is profit-led or 
wage-led, and whether productivity growth is labour-displacing or labour-
augmenting in different economies. But this is not the only way to analyse 
distribution dynamics in the context of development, particularly in instances 
where the focus is on the role of public policies which only indirectly inflict on 
wage or labour income (Storm and Naastepad, 2005), or where the structure of 
firms is critical for the aggregate outcomes (Singh, 1998); or where the wage–
profit structure is not a fair representation of the income-generating process, as 
in many developing economies; or where the approximation of capital and wage 
income by the national accounting components of value added would rather 
obscure the basic facts on the ground. Moreover, the wage–profit schedule 
suffers, at present, from critical limitations given the excessively aggregated 
character of such statistics where available (a similar limitation applies to 
aggregate production functions, as correctly summarized in Temple, 2006), not 
to mention the practical unavailability of wage and profit data in many parts of 
the developing world. Thus, in this model the approach is to focus on aggregate 
demand and its components as resulting from the influence of policy measures, 
in line with the theoretical discussion outlined above, and to hold to the 
assumption, which would seem hard to question, that improvements of domestic 
consumption and government spending at par with the growth of national 
income cannot but reflect improvements in income distribution. In other words, 
the evolution of income and consumption aggregates in the context of 
development are assumed to follow ‘Engel curve’ patterns and government 
spending stimuli are assumed to be welfare-improving.18  
 
 
7. The Baseline Projection 
 
As hinted above, the baseline can be understood as an extrapolation of the past 
on given policy assumptions, ruling out any major changes of policy regime.19 
The growth of the main variables is summarized in Figure 1. The ‘bounce-back’ 
from recession continues into 2011. Although growth rates of trade and 
investment in the immediate recovery phase are no guide to what will follow,  
the baseline assumptions imply GDP growth sustained at a reasonably high rate 
thereafter while trade slows down, energy supply and use increase very slowly 
and inflation moderates after a peak in 2015. At first sight the global outcome 
looks good but we need to check how GDP growth is distributed between blocs 
and, recalling that the baseline is predicated on the absence of negative shocks, 
we need to examine the implied evolution of financial imbalances.  
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The baseline is not, however, a mirror of the past, even if the underlying 
patterns are similar. So far as GDP growth is concerned Figure 2 shows relative 
long-run slowdowns for China and India, weaker growth in the US after 2012 
and disappointing growth in low-income Africa. As noted in the discussion 
above, price dynamics and supply constraints operating in the model influence 
the outcome. As China, and to a lesser extent India, have grown at a fast pace in 
the pre-crisis period, they have added to the global demand for raw materials, 
energy, transport services, and also food and basic needs. As a result, 
competitiveness at the low-end of the manufacturing chain (more heavily 
dependent on inputs) results as well in a partial deceleration of capital outflows 
which were supposed to help sustain over-borrowing in other regions like the 
US.  The gradual acceleration of GDP growth in ‘other high-income’ countries 
is mostly driven by Japan, which will benefit from its export capacity and 
accumulated foreign assets. The ‘resource-rich middle-income’ bloc shows a 
sustained growth performance on the back of a relentless increase in the price of 
oil and relatively high prices of commodities (see Figure 3).  
18 
  
Figure 1. World Growth Rates 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030
GDP at market rates
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030
Population
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030
GDP per capita at market rates
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030
Private investment
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030
Exports of goods and services
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030
Energy production
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030
Domestic ccy inflation
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030
Capacity utilisation
World growth rates                    Baseline                    Units: % per year
19 
  
 
 
 
Figure 2. GDP Growth Rates in Each Bloc 
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Figure 3. Relative Price Indexes 
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Figure 4. Current accounts as percent of GDP 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 shows global imbalances reasserting themselves with a similar pattern 
to the past, subject to the relatively more gradual growth of demand in the main 
developed countries. It can be estimated that the US becomes a very large 
debtor with net liabilities rising to 100 per cent of annual GDP while Japan, 
China and some other East Asian countries acquire net assets of a similar 
magnitude.20 Surpluses in resource-rich countries as well as in Africa will 
gradually fade away as growth will continue to require greater domestic 
spending (infrastructure and private investment) facing higher prices of 
manufacturing products (see above). 
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by faster expansion of domestic spending and what the consequences of such a 
policy shift would be for the US and other high-income blocs on the one hand 
and other middle- and low-income blocs on the other. 
 
 
8. Domestic Expansion in China and India 
 
The next simulation assumes development strategies in China and India 
consistent with targeted GDP growth of 8 per cent p.a. for each country. 
Crucially, these strategies have to overcome under-consumption tendencies and 
be financially viable and acceptable to international and domestic investors. 
 
The assumed measures in both countries include shifting the focus from export 
activities towards domestic consumption and investment by changing 
regulations and incentives. Initial stimuli are amplified by private spending 
multipliers, reducing government deficits and, pari pasu, eroding the current 
account. In the case of China the reduction of the current account surplus is 
marked and net accumulation of external assets eventually comes to an end. The 
impact on the current account and external position is much smaller in the case 
of India because of the relatively closed structure of the Indian economy.21 In 
both countries the emphasis on faster growth of income through incentives to 
private consumption and investment reduces the ratio of government debt to 
GDP.  
 
The most significant outcomes of this simulation are the implications for the US 
and other countries (see Figure 5). There is little increase in trade in the world 
as a whole because domestic expenditure in China and India has a low import 
content, as pointed out by Akyuz (2010b). Benefits, such as they are, accrue 
mainly to other rich countries, which presumably increase their market share in 
world exports of manufactures and services as China and India shift to domestic 
spending (Figure 6). There is almost no ‘trickle-down’ of domestic expansion in 
China and India to the rest of Asia or to developing countries in Africa and 
Latin America or even to oil and commodity exporters in the ‘resource-rich 
middle-income’ countries.  
 
Indeed, China’s current account surplus is transferred to other rich countries and 
likewise for the deterioration of the external balance in India (Figure 7). 
Accumulated net external positions follow a similar pattern (Figure 8). In sum, 
this scenario yields reasonably good growth patterns for China and India with 
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Figure 5. Change in global growth rates 
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Figure 6. Higher GDP growth in rich countries, little benefit to other regions 
 
potential benefits to internal income distribution. Thus, from their perspective 
alone results are satisfactory. But the outcome is less reassuring from a global 
perspective. Although financial surpluses in China and India diminish, the same 
cannot be said for imbalances in other countries (the current account deficit in 
the US remains dangerously high and the surplus in Japan and some other high 
income countries is unprecedented). Therefore the risk of renewed financial 
crisis remains as external positions become larger and increasingly unbalanced. 
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Equally important, this China–India growth scenario does not benefit the rest of 
the developing world and therefore does not contribute to the resolution of 
tensions implied by global inequality.  
 
Figure 7. Surpluses of China and India transferred to other rich countries  
 
Figure 8. International positions follow a similar shift over time  
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global inequality elsewhere, a more sustainable global development perspective 
has to be differently designed. A global development scenario will require 
coordinated policy efforts by many countries across different policy areas. An 
empirical assessment of this kind is attempted below and should be interpreted 
as an illustration of a feasible and attractive scenario in its own economic terms, 
given that the previous ones are not, even if are politically more ‘accessible’. 
After scrutinizing the reliability and internal consistency of this scenario, the 
onus rests on public opinion and on policy makers to take a model simulation of 
this kind to the next level. 
 
Globally coordinated economic policies are potentially beneficial for all but 
require a high level of engagement and must attend to several issues 
simultaneously.22 For example, as shown in Izurieta and Singh (2010), a major 
obstacle to a global growth convergence strategy is the pressure on world 
supplies of raw materials and energy. Policies targeted on renewable resources, 
efficiency of production and use of energy and primary commodities, and 
reduced pollution and emissions are required to alleviate this constraint. 
Likewise, if poorer countries in the developing world are going to grow at a fast 
pace, additional efforts have to be made to accelerate and diversify export 
growth and to avoid rising domestic and foreign deficits. Such developments 
will not happen spontaneously. For export-oriented development to succeed, 
infrastructure has to be put in place, and market access, technology and upfront 
investments must be secured. Also, to achieve a meaningful turn-around of the 
tendency towards under-consumption, export growth needs to be paralleled by 
rising domestic demand and rising real wages.  
 
The global development scenario illustrated here is defined by a combination 
of:  
 targets for government expenditure, public and private investment that 
supposedly facilitate a more equitable distribution of employment and 
income 
 stable real exchange rates and greater efforts towards formation of 
regional trade areas in developing regions 
 selective incentives and support for exports of commodities, 
manufactures and services by countries that lack a sufficient export base 
 cooperation in management of energy resources and markets to maintain 
incentives for producers and users of energy to invest in green 
technologies and reduce long-run dependence on fossil fuels.  
 
The targets for income growth and energy saving imply GDP growth in the 
world as a whole rising gradually from 4 per cent to 5 per cent with energy 
27 
  
 
 
Figure 9. A Global development scenario  
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Figure 10. Convergence of growth rates without sacrifices  
 
 
 
production and use restricted to about 1 per cent per year.23 Growth of 
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countries working together, could potentially achieve target growth rates for all 
developing blocs (Figure 10), resulting in a major reduction in global inequality 
without requiring any reduction in growth rates in high-income countries. 
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well as global imbalances in the form of current account surpluses and deficits 
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
80 90 00 10 20 30
USA
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
80 90 00 10 20 30
Europe
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
80 90 00 10 20 30
Other High Income
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
80 90 00 10 20 30
Resource-rich Middle Income
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
80 90 00 10 20 30
China
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
80 90 00 10 20 30
India
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
80 90 00 10 20 30
Latin America
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
80 90 00 10 20 30
Africa
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
80 90 00 10 20 30
Asia Low Income
Growth rate of GDP
Baseline (broken line), Globally coordinated development (solid line)    Units: % per year
29 
  
(Figure 11). Deficits in developing regions remain manageable. Accumulating 
external positions (Figure 12) are in most cases much less extreme than in the 
baseline.24 
 
In summary, therefore, there is a huge potential for improving the performance 
of the world economy and achieving substantial convergence of GDP and 
income levels in low and middle income countries with levels already achieved 
 
Figure 11. Significant reduction of global imbalances  
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Figure 12. Relative improvements over inherited external positions  
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somewhat unstable system in which advantages and problems accumulate over 
long periods of time where market-determined patterns of development often 
have unintended side effects and in the worst cases imperil the security of the 
world as a whole. The starting point for improved policy coordination has to be 
a more realistic analysis of the operation of global markets and the world 
economy as a system with attention to long-run as well as short-run effects and 
acceptance of the need to balance the interests of the vast majority of people in 
the world, not only those in highly developed countries or in command of 
particularly scarce resources. 
 
10. Conclusion 
 
Over the past two decades the world economy experienced an unprecedented 
build-up of global imbalances, followed by a severe global recession. 
Meanwhile, the underlying globalization process did not in most cases improve 
the real incomes of the majority of the world population in line with the 
improvement in the distribution of income among countries. In the period 
before the current crisis the real world economy seemed to perform 
exceptionally well. Between 2003 and 2007 it achieved a remarkably fast 
growth of aggregate world product of more than 5 per cent per annum in 
purchasing power parity terms. Developing countries grew much faster than 
developed countries and the number of people living below $1.25 a day fell to 
less than a billion people. A notable aspect was fast growth in India and China, 
the world’s two most populous countries and hitherto among the poorest.   
 
However, as argued in this contribution, such growth was based in major 
advanced countries on over-borrowing, domestic deficits and bubbles in the 
property and stock markets, while major emerging economies sustained an 
export model by the relative under-consumption of their workers. The 
liberalized global economy was guided by the ideological belief that free 
markets not only provide efficient allocations by prices, but also that they can 
correct themselves if they are out of equilibrium. The deep economic and 
financial crisis led to welcome first steps towards a measure of cooperation 
between nation states. The international agreements on interest rate cuts, fiscal 
stimuli and other measures among the G20 helped to avert a meltdown of the 
financial system in advanced countries. This notwithstanding, instead of success 
leading to greater future cooperation, as many of us expected, the result has 
been the opposite, currently calling for restraint in the stimuli while the world 
economy has not, and could have not, recovered from the deep crisis in which it 
was immersed. This does not augur well for the world economy or for the well-
being of the people. 
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John Maynard Keynes repeatedly observed that the economy was a highly 
complex machine which we do not fully understand.  This article and the 
Cambridge-Alphametrics-Model on which it is based represent an effort to 
appreciate the complexities of the world economy and its components and to 
seek avenues for international policy coordination. The main message that 
comes out of this exercise is the realization that the world economy is highly 
interdependent and increasingly needs far-reaching and very many specific 
interventions for it to achieve its full potential while pursuing a better 
distribution of income and employment. This in turn requires deeper knowledge 
of the functioning of the world economy and new institutions to achieve the 
required high levels of cooperation between nation states. At the moment the 
primary global institutions of economic coordination such as the IMF are, 
regrettably, more a part of the problem rather than its solution.   
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Notes 
 
1.A different kind of argument that sees the international financial system as 
having a built-in deflationary bias reaches much the same conclusion. The bias 
arises from the fact that debtor countries are obliged to contract expenditure 
while there is no such obligation on the part of creditor countries to expand, 
which also leads to a shortfall of demand at the global level. 
 
2.These include von Arnim (2009), Barbosa-Filho et al. (2006), Blecker 
(1998/2000), Cooper (2005), Cripps et al. (2005), D’Arista (2007), Godley 
(1995, 1999, 2003), Roubini (2005), Rybiński (2006), Taylor (2010), Truman 
(2005) and White (2010). 
 
3.Baker (2010) fully documents the very subsidiary role that sub-prime 
mortgages played as a contribution to the economic crisis in the US and shows 
how the build-up of asset bubbles was the central feature of the impending 
imbalances that led to a global crisis. 
 
4.The rather more complex relationship between income deflation and the terms 
of trade is elucidated in Patnaik (2008). 
 
5.A similar argument, coined ‘transplanting industry’ was put forward by 
Robinson (1979) to explain why there is no hope that the process of ‘dependent 
industrialization’ would lead to full employment even in the recipient country 
and cannot be a means for ‘a line of development based on human needs’. 
 
6.See Cornia (2010), van der Hoeven (2010), UN-DESA (2006b, 2010), Vos 
(2010) for global overviews; Sobhan (2010) for South Asia; Akyuz (2010a), 
Montalvo and Ravallion (2010) for China; and Galbraith (2010), Galbraith and 
Garcilazo (2004), Irvin (2008) for developed economies. 
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7.Since 2002 this trend was enhanced by dollar devaluation. The US, together 
with some other core countries, enjoys the privilege of incurring external debt in 
its own currency while holding assets abroad that are largely denominated in 
other currencies. Thus, a dollar devaluation does not increase the domestic 
value of its external debt but does increase the domestic value of external assets. 
In practice, between February 2002 and December 2007 dollar devaluation vis à 
vis major currencies was 34 per cent. External assets were US$ 6.5 trillion in 
2002 and US$ 18.5 trillion in 2007. The devaluation alone increased the value 
of assets held abroad by US residents by almost US$ 5 trillion,that is about 30 
per cent of US GDP in 2008. This is a very large holding gain, even if spread 
over six years. 
 
8.It has also been suggested that holding gains accrued to foreign investors. It is 
difficult to evaluate the size and distribution of holding gains in peripheral 
countries as very few data are available on sector balance sheets and wealth. 
 
9.At this level of aggregation, H represents the combined spending of the public 
and the private sectors, while Y stands for national income. Y therefore ignores 
taxes, which cancel out in the aggregate. H includes consumption and the 
acquisition of inventories and durable and investment goods by both the public 
and private sectors. The net acquisition of financial assets, NA, includes 
borrowing and financial investment by households, corporations and 
government. Netting out domestic transactions, the figure for each country 
represents financial transactions with non-residents that may further be broken 
down into inward and outward flows of direct investment and portfolio 
investment, as well as banking transactions and transactions by monetary 
authorities. 
 
10.See Cripps et al. (2007) for greater analytical detail. Stock/flow consistent 
frameworks are treated extensively in Godley and Lavoie (2007), Dos Santos 
and Zezza (2008), and Dos Santos and Macedo e Silva (2010). 
 
11.This identity is useful for examining private sector behaviour. Government 
budgets, financial operations and debt are identified separately in the model but 
for reasons of brevity will be omitted here. 
 
12.Government debt comes into the equation because the net external position 
of a country is the sum of financial positions of the government and the private 
sector. 
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13.Moreover, according to authors like Galbraith (2008), the US has 
systematically relied on a proactive role of the state to sustain high rates of 
growth, based on institutions created with the New Deal after the Great 
Depression. In Galbraith’s calculations, by adding direct government spending 
(on the military, health care, social security, education, etc.) to the amounts that 
are channelled through private institutions and foundations that either receive 
subsidies or can alleviate constraints by receiving tax-exempted donations, the 
public sector is behind more than 60 per cent of US GDP. 
 
14.Admittedly a refinement of Paul Sweezy’s Theory of Capitalist 
Development. 
 
15.There are perhaps two not irrelevant differences between the position of the 
G20 and that of the UN. First, the G20 does not represent all nations and her 
leadership cannot be taken for granted, as emerged in the UN General Assembly 
Summit on the Global Financial Crisis, June 2010. Second, the focus of the G20 
is recovery from the current crisis, by combinations of fiscal and monetary 
policy, but there is no hint regarding the existence of systemic faults in the 
world economy. 
 
16.The CAM is at present subject to a major expansion under the auspices of 
the European Commission and the collaboration of a network of academic and 
policy-oriented institutions in Europe and various developing countries in Asia, 
Africa and Latin America. Furthermore, a more sophisticated version that fully 
integrates financial markets has been developed for the UN Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs, under the guidance of Rob Vos. 
 
17.The issues of growth and production have been subject to controversy for 
decades and we do not consider the debate settled even if a considerable 
majority of macroeconomic models adopt, rather uncritically, Cobb-Douglas 
production functions (see Davidson and Kregel, 1994; Felipe and Fisher, 2003; 
Felipe and McCombie, 2006; Harcourt, 1972, 2006; Kaldor, 1996; Kregel, 
1971; McCombie, 1982; Rada and Taylor, 2004; Setterfield, 2010; Taylor, 
2004; Temple, 2006). 
 
18.Ongoing expansions of the CAM under the ‘Augur’ project, and of the UN-
DESA GPM under the guidance of Rob Vos, will contemplate, one way or the 
other, issues like employment and the demographic structure. The relevance of 
the former for welfare is straightforward; the impact of demographics is under 
exploration, while some interesting findings are emerging from the Latin 
American experience (see Ros, 2009). 
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19.The reader may be tempted, as were the authors of this manuscript at the 
time of writing (first half of 2010), to consider a ‘double-dip’ recession instead. 
The rationale for a double-dip is obvious: global unemployment is likely to act 
as a major drag for aggregate demand; policy stimuli in many countries are 
likely to be withdrawn before private activity takes up the slack; high levels of 
public and private sector debt may inhibit the appetite for more deficit 
spending; and financial stress is nowhere yet dissipated. However likely, for 
such a scenario to be deployed as baseline, the modeller would have to bet on 
the proper timing and intensity of the factors triggering the subsequent crisis, 
which are uncertain to say the least. Besides, the nature of this exercise is not to 
‘predict’ the future but to deploy plausible ‘what if’ scenarios. The chosen 
baseline should therefore be interpreted ‘as if’ the aggregate sectors in the 
countries and blocs depicted here will start to behave ‘as usual’, even if that 
entails greater leverage, greater risk, and excessive reliance on capital inflows in 
some parts of the world and on reserve accumulation in other parts, as recent 
history has demonstrated. Is that sustainable? Most probably not; hence the 
need to suggest alternative scenarios! 
 
20.The continuous accumulation of external liabilities of the US before and 
during the world economic crisis has led many observers to believe in a 
presumed resemblance of the US with highly indebted countries in the 
developing world, like Argentina for example. There are critical differences, 
however. For one thing, the US as the de facto issuer of the world’s reserve 
asset, is indebted in its own currency. For another, unless the structure of the 
global payments and reserve system is altered (which would mean by definition 
a break with the ‘baseline’), for the global economy to continue to growth the 
US will have to continue to run even larger deficits in either the current or the 
capital account (the so-call Triffin dilemma). In the ‘business as usual’ scenario 
there is no assumed change of behaviour in the patterns of reserve accumulation 
by the US partners and therefore they will continue to invest in dollar assets in 
order, among other reasons, to protect the value of their investments. 
 
21.India and other South Asian countries have lower ratios of imports to GDP 
than countries in other parts of the world. 
 
22.The reader should be warned that what is presented here as ‘a package’ 
resulted from a considerable series of model experiments in which each of the 
measures proposed (or similar ones) was tried in isolation and the limitations 
revealed by such outcomes in isolation in turn triggered other elements now 
included in ‘the package’. In other words, the elements necessitate each other, 
but each one in isolation is not going to yield a desirable solution. 
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23.Thus, the scenario requires improvements of energy efficiency of output at 
the rate of nearly 5 per cent compared with the recent past. This is not a 
negligible target and may lead to scepticism. It is worth mentioning that during 
the previous oil crises in the 1970s, some countries — notably France, Japan, 
and to a lesser extent Sweden, Germany and Switzerland — achieved 
comparable improvements, triggered by the circumstances. Over the subsequent 
years, similar success stories followed in Brazil and in China. At present, with 
even more advanced technologies and with greater international permeation of 
know-how and financing, it would seem that there are less ‘economic’ 
impediments for such improvements in efficiency to be widespread. Besides, 
with energy price escalations and environmental threats looming, it is hard to 
believe that the conditions are not even more pressing now than in the late 
1970s for decisive policy action to take place. 
 
24.The main counter-example is the bloc of other high-income countries, 
mainly due to Japan which would increase its current account surplus and 
external asset position in all scenarios. Increased surpluses in ‘resource-rich 
countries’ result from a reliance on the relative abundance of primary products 
and oil and diversification into manufacturing and services in these regions. 
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